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Dawid et al.’s [2015] No Alternatives
Argument: an empiricist note.1
Philippe van Basshuysen
Abstract
In a recent paper [2], Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger claim to
prove the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation via
the No Alternatives Argument. In this note, I argue that from
an empiricist point of view, their "proof" begs the question
in the sense that it cannot convince someone who has not al-
ready been convinced of non-empirical theory confirmation before.
Keywords: No Alternatives Argument (NAA), theory confirmation,
Bayesian networks, empiricism, Principle of Indifference
1 Outline
In a recent paper [2] which has turned out to be rather influential (cf.
[4]) – even in popular scientific discussions ([6], [7]) –, Dawid, Hartmann
and Sprenger (DHS) argue in favour of the validity of the No Alterna-
tives Argument. The No Alternatives Argument (NAA), often used by
scientists, politicians, journalists, in the court room and in everyday life
– roughly concludes from a lack of alternatives to a hypothesis or theory
to the truth of that hypothesis/theory.2 The argument is regarded as
highly problematic in many contexts. For example, in the courtroom,
where the principle "in dubio pro reo" is in force, NAA is usually not
sufficient a reason for a conviction. In the following, I will restrain the
analysis (as do DHS) to scientific hypotheses. The reason is that the
applicability of NAA to other contexts may not be equivalent (e.g. be-
cause of different standards of what counts as an alternative hypothesis)
– and would be an interesting field for further research.
DHS claim that "if valid, [NAA] would demonstrate the possibility
of non-empirical theory confirmation" ([2], 2). They give a proba-
bilistic analysis of the argument, representing the target probability
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function with the help of a Bayesian network, and conclude that under
certain (plausible) conditions NAA can indeed give confirmation to a
hypothesis. Thus, the proof of the possibility of non-empirical theory
confirmation. In this note I argue that from an empiricist point of
view, however, the "proof" begs the question in the sense that it cannot
convince someone who has not already been convinced of non-empirical
theory confirmation before.
I sketch DHS’s argument in (2); in (3), I argue that at least one of
the assumptions needed for their argument presupposes non-empirical
theory confirmation and thus stands on shaky grounds. In (3.1), a coun-
terexample to this assumption shows that it must in fact not be expected
to hold. I conclude in (4), urging caution in the application of Bayesian
networks to normative problems.
2 DHS’s argument
It is usually undisputed that an empirical hypothesis H is confirmed or
disconfirmed by a piece of evidence E that at least partially falls into
the hypothesis’ domain, or does not fall into its domain but "can be
related to H by another scientific theory" ([2], 2). If one is in favour of
Bayesian confirmation theory, the degree of confirmation can be calcu-
lated with the help of probability theory and using some confirmation
measure. This is due to the hypothesis being probabilistically dependent
on the evidence. Irrespective of which confirmation measure (if any) one
wishes to use, the evidence incrementally confirms the hypothesis in the
Bayesian sense just in case P (H|E) > P (H).
In the case of NAA, the situation appears to be more difficult because
the "evidence" does not seem to raise/decrease the probability of the
hypothesis since it does not fall even partially into its domain: the fact
that – despite considerable effort – we have not found any alternative
to the hypothesis in question is not usually a fact the hypothesis talks
about,3 nor can it prima facie be related to it by another theory. Thus,
the hypothesis is on the face of it not conditionally dependent on the
evidence; so the evidence does not confirm or disconfirm it.
Let’s consider DHS’s argument for NAA – more precisely, that NAA
does in fact constitute confirmation in the Bayesian sense – in detail.
What DHS claim is that there is a common cause – a mediating state-
ment that does establish a probabilistic dependency between a hypoth-
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esis, H, and us not having found suitable alternatives to H: namely, that
there really aren’t many alternatives to H. This mediating statement
supposedly has direct influence on both the scientists not having found
suitable alternatives and on the probability of H. This is because ar-
guably, less alternatives make it less likely that scientists will find any
of them; and arguably less alternatives to H make it more likely that H
is the true hypothesis (this will be the critical assumption challenged in
this note). According to DHS, via this mediating statement confirmation
is possible.
I give a (simplified) formal representation of this line of argument.
Define the propositions:
• H: the hypothesis we are interested in;
• NA: the scientific community has not yet found an alternative to
H satisfying conditions Ω;
• Yk: there are k alternatives to H satisfying conditions Ω.
A couple of remarks:
(1) What counts as a hypothesis? Let us assume a very inclusive defini-
tion: any set of mutually non-contradictory (scientific) statements
is a hypothesis.
(2) According to DHS, Ω subsumes the following conditions: to satisfy
a set of theoretical constraints C; to be consistent with existing
data D; and to give distinguishable predictions for the outcome
of some set  of future experiments ([2], 4). The conditions are
deliberately left unspecified, since it is on the scientists to decide
which hypotheses count as real alternatives.
(3) It might seem odd that H is a set of statements in the object lan-
guage while NA and Yk are statements in a metalanguage. This
shows that we are not concerned with normal evidence that falls
into H’s domain, but rather with observations about H. Noth-
ing hinges on this language-metalanguage distinction though. We
could form a statement equivalent to H in a metalanguage (let T:
"H is true").4
DHS [2] then specify their target probability function with the help of
a Bayesian network. As usual when dealing with Bayesian nets, let an
italic proposition denote the respective random variable. NA and H
are propositional variables taking the values y and n, whereas Yk takes
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Figure 1: Below part: Bayesian net rep-
resenting the target probability function
in [2] (simplified); the mediating vari-
able Yk establishes a dependence be-
tween NA and H which, before learning
about Yk, are independent (above part).
values in the natural numbers. Fig. 1 shows two Bayesian nets, one
representing the situation before learning about Yk (above), and one a
simplified model as targeted by DHS [2] for the situation after learning
about Yk (below).
Under some supposedly plausible conditions on the probability table,
it can then be calculated that P (H|NA) > P (H), i.e. NA confirms H. We
do not need to specify all these conditions here since they do not affect
this analysis (for details see [2] or [4]). To give an example, one crucial
condition for a successful confirmation (which might appear to be a
problematic one but is not considered here) is that P (Y =∞) < 1. Note
that two very important conditions are the assumptions given above, i.e.
that both NA and H are dependent on Yk in a specific way – which will
be the object of the next section.
3 Problems
What I would like to draw the attention to – although I am not saying
all the other assumptions specified in the Bayesian network in Fig. 1 are
indisputable – is the dependency of H on Yk. In assumptions A4 and
A5 ([2], 8), DHS specify the nature of the alleged dependency formally:
namely, that the conditional probability P (H|Yk) is non-increasing in
k, and that there is at least one pair (i, k) ∈ N2 with i < k, for which
P (H|Yi) > P (H|Yk); i.e. more alternatives don’t make the hypothesis
more likely, and there is at least one case where more alternatives make
the hypothesis less likely.
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Now why should this dependency be the case? Just like NA, the
mediating statement Yk does not usually fall into the hypothesis’
domain,5 so this dependency is not trivial but in need of an argument.
What is their argument? They give an informal justification earlier in
their paper ([2], 4):
"We assume that scientists who develop a theory in accordance with
available data do not have a perfectly reliable method to select the true
theory if false theories can be constructed that are also consistent with
the available data. Under this condition, a lower number of possible
scientific theories that can account for a certain set of empirical data
increases the degree of belief that the theory developed by scientists is
adequate."
Note that this is a stronger claim than the non-increasing condi-
tional probability needed in the formal execution of NAA (see above).
This doesn’t matter though since I argue that any direct dependency is
suspicious from an empiricist’s point of view.
Let’s consider this argument in greater detail. DHS claim that a
smaller set of alternatives makes it more likely for the scientists to choose
the correct hypothesis, thus raises the degree of belief in the theory chosen
by the scientists. First of all, the question is what they mean by the
indefinite "degree of belief" – whose belief exactly?
It could be some ordinary person’s, or some scientist’s, or some sci-
entist community’s (etc.) belief. Now it might well be that there are
situations where ordinary people, some scientists, or scientific commu-
nities think this way. This claim is wholly descriptive and would need
an empirical backup. However, the goal of the argument is to show why
NAA is valid. A description or psychological investigation into how peo-
ple actually reason does not suffice for this claim – we are in need of
reasons for why this way of inferring is a good one. In short, the sub-
jective route has no normative grip and does not succeed. I do think,
however, that the subjective interpretation of the argument might yield
a plausible psychological explanation of why NAA is used (cf. (4)) – this
could be the object of an empirical investigation.
Dawid et al. choose the more objective route (cf. [2], 10 f.) in
which it is a rational constraint that P (H|Yk) be non-increasing in k.
But why is this rational? Why should the probability of a hypothesis
depend on the number of alternative hypotheses satisfying Ω? Their
argument (as cited above) is that the smaller the set of rival hypotheses,
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the more likely it is that scientists chose the true one when they "picked"
their hypothesis, since they "do not have a perfectly reliable method to
select the true [hypothesis]" (4). However, this formulation is confusing.
First of all, scientists don’t pick hypotheses like lottery tickets but rather
put them forward or learn them from other scientists, and then theory
choice is a complex matter (e.g. Kuhn [5]). Now in this case, NAA,
there is no choice whatsoever involved since there is only one hypothesis
H the scientists have arrived at, and one could possibly choose from.
We are interested in the probability of H, conditional on the number of
its alternatives. To sum up: we are not talking about the probability
of scientists choosing the true hypothesis, but about the probability of
some hypothesis – the one the scientists worked out.
Now there is not yet any argument to the effect that the probability
of H be different if there are a hundred alternative hypotheses than if
there are a million alternative hypotheses to it. That scientists "do not
have a perfectly reliable method to select the true theory" is – at least
prima facie – completely useless a reason for this claim. One could argue
that the probability of scientists "picking" the true hypothesis together
with the fact that they picked H, have an influence on the probability of
H. This, however, confuses the logical structure of the argument because
it presupposes non-empirical evidence. The structure is thus: we want
to evaluate the probability of a hypothesis. This evaluation is based on
empirical evidence. Sometimes, there is also reference to an authority
involved – particularly in the layman’s belief in scientists’ theories. These
"arguments from authority" are made in many contexts, and may be
rational in many situations. The point here is, however, that it is another
attempt to make use of non-empirical evidence and – if successful or not –
cannot prove the possibility of this kind of evidence. From an empiricist
point of view, the fact that scientists have a probability x of choosing the
true hypothesis and that they choose H prima facie have no influence
on the probability of H.
The point becomes clearer when we ask who is to evaluate a hypoth-
esis. In principle, anyone can; but we are concerned with the validity
of an argument for non-empirical evidence, so our standards are high:
a "perfectly rational perspective", if you will. The agents that come
closest to this perspective in the case of scientific hypotheses arguably
are the scientists themselves. Now it would be odd if someone in a
scientific community said, "our subjective probability of H raises because
we believe in it". The fact that we believe in a hypothesis does not give
extra boost to its probability – if it did, by iterated conditionalisation
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we could boost any hypothesis to some desired threshold (which may
be certainty).
Once we leave references to other non-empirical evidence aside, there
is no obvious reason to the effect that the probability of a theory be
dependent on the number of its alternatives (in the described non-
increasing way, or in any way). To establish such dependence would
imply reference to some principle of rationality governing the probabil-
ity function. The natural candidate for such a principle (although there
might be others) is the Principle of Indifference (PI). Applying PI, we
get P (H|Yk) = 1/k. However, it seems suspect to think about the truth
of scientific theories like the winning of a lottery. Besides the usual ar-
guments against PI,6 its application is particularly questionable in this
case, for we are not in a situation of ignorance, of the absence of any
reason to expect one event rather than another. Rather, we hold H be-
cause we believe it is true. How could we reasonably assign the same
probability to H as to a number of unknown hypotheses – hypotheses we
have absolutely no idea about?
In conclusion, instead of proving that there is non-empirical evidence,
the argument in fact seems to imply a non-empirical move: it presup-
poses that the probability of a hypothesis is dependent on how many
alternatives it has, and to argue for this claim seems to involve either a
regress to non-empirical evidence (argument from authority), or some
doubtful application of some doubtful principle (PI). Anyone uncon-
vinced of this principle will remain unconvinced of the possibility of
non-empirical evidence.
3.1 A counterexample
The principled argument in (3) will become stronger if there is a case
in which P (H|Yk) > P (H|Yi) for some H, with (i, k) ∈ N2 and i < k.
One situation where this may be the case is the following. There are ten
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses, H1 – H10, relative
to Ω. Now suppose one of the hypotheses, H1, becomes impossible –
maybe as a result of an additional restriction on Ω, or of learning about
contradicting data (in which case that data must of course be assumed to
be certain). Now suppose further there is some background hypothesis,
Hb, whose probability diminishes after learning ¬H1. This in turn makes
some of the alternative hypotheses positively related to Hb, H2 say, less
likely, while the probability of other hypotheses not dependent on Hb
(say H10) overproportionally increases. So learning about one alternative
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Figure 2: Boolean algebra representing probability function Pi; there
are ten rival hypotheses, and a background hypothesis positively
related to H1 – H5.
"falling out" of the sample space can reduce the probability a rational
agent may assign to hypotheses.
The idea can be realised through different probability distributions
(and could be generalised but for our purpose one plausible instance is
sufficient). Consider the following probability distribution. Imagine
Case1. There are ten hypotheses, so Y = 9 for each of H1 – H10; and
we have a background hypothesis Hb. We form a probability function,
Pi, obeying the following assumptions:
• Let the initial probabilities:
– Pi is equally distributed over H1 through H10, so H1 = . . . =
H10 = .1
– Pi(Hb) = .5
• Hb follows from H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5, and its negation follows
from the rest of the hypotheses: Pi(Hb|H1) = . . . = Pi(Hb|H5) = 1
and Pi(Hb|H6) = . . . = Pi(Hb|H10) = 0.
Case1 is displayed in the Boolean algebra in Fig. 2.
Case2. Now assume H1 is not an alternative anymore. Thus a new
probability function, Pj , must be formed, for which the following is the
case:
Pj(H1) = 0, or Pj(¬H1) = 1 (1)
Also, learning about ¬H1 decreases the probability of Hb, by condi-
tionalisation on ¬H1:
Pj(Hb) = Pi(Hb|¬H1) = Pi(Hb ∩ ¬H1)
Pi(¬H1) = .4/.9 = .4 (2)
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Figure 3: Boolean algebra representing probability function Pj : sim-
ple conditionalisation after learning about hypothesis H1 "falling
out" of the sample space.
Now the question is, how should we rationally update our belief in
hypotheses H2 – H10? What is the evidence we should conditionalise on?
We could conditionalise on (1) which yields a result satisfying DHS’s
condition, namely a normalised, equal distribution over H2 – H10. For
example, for H2:
Pj(H2) = Pi(H2|¬H1) = .1/.9 = .1
Equally for H3 – H10. Figure 3 shows the resulting probability distribu-
tion.
This way of conditionalising, however, ignores (2), the fact that the
background hypothesis is less likely than under Pi – a fact that should
favour hypotheses not positively correlated with Hb over the ones that
imply Hb. Arguably, a rational agent should take (2) into account, as a
real piece of evidence, and may thus gain another probability distribution
Pj∗ through conditionalisation on (2). Jeffrey Conditionalisation (which
is needed because the "evidence" we conditionalise on is not certain)
yields for H2:
Pj∗(H2) = Pi(H2|Hb) ∗ Pj(Hb) = .1/.5 ∗ .4 = .08
, parallel for H3 – H5; and
Pj∗(H6) = . . . = Pj∗(H10) = Pi(H6|¬Hb) ∗ Pj(¬Hb) = .1/.5 ∗ .5 = .1
This way of conditionalising respects the intuition that the hypotheses
not correlated with Hb should benefit from the decrease of its proba-
bility. However, it in turn ignores (1), and is not normalised. Through
successive conditionalisation of Pj(H2) – Pj(H10) on ¬H1, (1) can be
taken into account and the resulting distribution is normalised over the
remaining H2 – H10:
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Figure 4: Boolean algebra representing probability function Pj∗∗:
taking into account that the background hypothesis, and thus hy-
potheses positively correlated to it, becomes less likely after learning
¬H1.
Pj∗∗(H2) = . . . = Pj∗∗(H5) =
Pj∗(H2∩¬H1)
Pi(¬H1) = .08/.9 ≈ .0988
; and
Pj∗∗(H6) = . . . = Pj∗∗(H10) = .01/.9 ≈ .1235
Pj∗∗ is normalised and seems to be a rational distribution, respecting the
intuition that the background hypothesis’ decrease in probability should
favour hypotheses 6-10 over hypotheses 2-5.
Thus, we have a case where a rational procedure yields lower
probabilities for some hypotheses (H2 – H5), relative to less alternatives
– a violation of DHS’s condition. If we successively conditionalise Hb
on the new probabilities of H2 – H10, its probability decreases further.
Fig. 4 shows the resulting probability distribution under Pj∗∗.
To sum this hypothetical example up, there may be cases where it
is rational to assign lower probabilities to some hypotheses for a lower
number of alternatives, while the probabilities of other hypotheses over-
proportionally increase. Finally note that the probabilities of H2 – H5 do
not decrease because of the learning of the extinction of an alternative
per se; they increase because of the specific assumptions about H2 – H5
and the situation they are embedded in. Learning about (the extinction
of) other alternatives, our belief in hypotheses may increase, decrease,
or remain constant. The expression "probability of a hypothesis given k
alternatives", or P (H|Yk), is in fact underspecified, and to assume it de-
creases with k (or increases, or whatever dependency you might want to
come up with) is suspicious, even from a somewhat empirically minded
Bayesian’s point of view.
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4 Conclusions
Why rain on a success story of the Bayesians’ parade? I do not intend to
dispute the ingenuity of DHS’s analysis. I think they succeed in showing
why NAA has an intuitive appeal, and why scientists in some contexts
reason this way. Even more: they show that, relative to some lines,
or principles, of thinking, NAA increases the subjective probability of
a hypothesis. Now these lines or principles may be conceived of as
more or less good. What DHS don’t achieve is to give a proof for the
general validity of NAA – those who weren’t convinced before won’t be
convinced after reading their [2].
What is the lesson from this? The most important lesson is, I think,
that we should be careful with the use of Bayesian nets, particularly
when there is some strong notion of normativity involved – which is
often the case in philosophy. In [1], Bovens and Hartmann claim that
"integrating Bayesian Networks into philosophical research leads to the-
oretical advances on long-standing questions in philosophy and has a
potential for practical applications", and that "philosophers have been
sadly absent in reaping the fruits from these new developments [the
development of Bayesian nets and their applications] in artificial intelli-
gence". As much as I agree to the general spirit of the statement – the
mathematisation of philosophical problems and the use of scientific tools
to tackle them –, it seems to me that in some philosophical applications
Bayesian nets are particularly convenient to hide assumptions which,
made explicit, would be considered problematic. Bayesian nets are very
useful if we want to make machines reason like humans, make or explain
probabilistic conclusions, make diagnoses, predictions and decisions, for
troubleshooting, or to find hidden causes. But in rationalisations of ar-
guments or certain ways of reasoning, we must be careful about which
kinds of (in)dependencies to specify and how they are justified.
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Notes
1 I would like to thank Dominik Klein, David Makinson, Stefan Schubert and Jan
Sprenger for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Thanks also
to two anonymous referees of this journal. Last but not least, many thanks to
Kristel Zarate Leon for producing the graphs.
2 For simplicity, let me in the following just use the term "hypothesis". The dif-
ference is not important for our purpose since "hypothesis" will just denote any
set of rather coherent scientific statements (see below).
3 There might be interesting cases where it does – but for the sake of simplicity,
assume it does not here and in the following.
4 In particular, Dawid et al. [2] use the statement "H is empirically adequate",
meaning H is consistent with past and future observations (3). They claim that
this prevents the possibility of there always being an infinite number of rival hy-
potheses that are empirically indistinguishable (cf. 5, 9). However, the condition
in the second remark that two hypotheses that make the same predictions count
as one and the same hypothesis seems to take care of that; so I don’t understand
why this move is needed, but since it does not touch the extension of this inves-
tigation (we could always easily replace "the probability of (the truth of) X" by
"the probability of the empirical adequacy of X"), let’s just leave it here.
5 Again, there might be interesting cases where it does – but let’s not consider
them here.
6 A discussion I don’t intend to enter here. For an extensive list of literature
concerned with it, as well as an own defusing of Bertrand’s Paradox, cf. Gyenis
& Rédei [3].
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